

page 50:

An example of this overt/covert replay system (of distributing propaganda forgeries) is the Israeli General Staff Campaign, which began as a rumor in France in early 1957, traversed the Mediterranean in false-intelligence form, appeared in India in published form and received its latest known replay in a book published in Moscow in the spring of 1959.

The Israeli General Staff Campaign

1. Rumor Campaign - France - Spring 1957 - French/Israeli General Staff Plans

In mid-March 1957 (six months after the Israeli and French/British military action against Egypt) rumors began circulating in official and diplomatic circles in Paris that the French and Israeli General Staffs were working together on a plan for joint Israeli/French action against Egypt. When the ~~rumors~~ rumors were traced it was learned in the first place that they had no foundation in fact, and in the second that all traceable tales on the subject ran back to a single local point of origin: ~~Paris~~ a Paris journalist named Andre UIMANN, who was notorious for his role as a pro-Soviet propagandist. (A point of interest in this connection is that UIMANN is the director of a small weekly newspaper, La Tribune des Nations, which fits the type description given in paragraph B-5 of Section VI below of the newspapers which have been used in surfacing and replay of ~~rumors~~ propaganda forgeries; that is, it has no connection with local Communist Party or front groups and does not propagandize on their behalf, but it does act consistently as a vehicle for pro-Bloc propaganda.)

(another ref to this, adding no other info, on page 59)

2. False Intelligence Report - Lebanon - Spring of 1957

During the first week in April 1957, an intelligence report was received from Beirut that France "was launching a plot in cooperation with Israel."
(another ref to this, without adding any other info, appears on page 57)

page 51:

6. Soviet "Whisper" - France - Spring of 1958

On 4 April 1958 Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Paris, told a Western diplomat that his Government was currently "worried about increased French/Israeli political and military cooperation," a worry which the diplomat promptly reported to his own foreign ministry.

(Rogov was identified by a 1954 defecting Soviet agent in the ~~service~~ service now known as KGB.)

Italian desk

25X1A9a

page 50:

(discussing steps through which propaganda-forgery campaign called "the Israeli General Staff Campaign" was distributed throughout Europe and Mid-East)

3. False Intelligence Report - Italy - Spring of 1957

At about the same time as the Lebanese report, above, an intelligence report of the same type was received from Italy.

This report added, "The Israeli press has not mentioned the matter, but details are being discussed publicly."

(another reference to this, without adding any other info, appears on page 57)

25X1A9a

Lebanon desk:

page 68:

5. Clandestine Newspaper as Surfacing Point

1958. Lebanon. The newspaper Beirut Al-Masaa, in which the "John H" Letter was surfaced on 25 August 1958, became overt when the new Lebanese Government came into power in the fall of 1958. At the time of the "John H" surfacing, however, it was outlawed and anyone caught with it (or other banned newspapers) in his possession was liable to a six-month jail sentence. The paper's political line was that of violent Arab nationalism, but according to an October 1958 report, "it is reputed to have Communists among its employees and close ties with the Cairo Al-Masaa (a daily which was noted for its heavy proportion of pro-Bloc propaganda items), and it publishes much material from TASS and other Soviet bloc news agencies." In other words, another newspaper to which the type description given in paragraph B-5 of Section VI applies: not a CP paper, but a chronic purveyor of pro-Bloc propaganda.

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Jordan desk:

page 59:

False Intelligence Reports

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... (other areas)

1959. Middle Eastern countries. In late March and early April 1959 photostatic copies of the forged Murphy Letter (which was a part of the Rountree Circular Campaign) were circulated in intelligence circles in several Middle Eastern countries.

(info from State Dept:)

page 64:

1959. Middle East. In late March and early April 1959 the Murphy Letter (also mentioned under "False Intelligence Reports," above) was sent by direct mail to certain Middle Eastern newspapers and Parliament members and to a member of the Government of at least one Middle Eastern country.

Info from State Dept:

page 64:

1959. Middle East. In late March and early April 1959 the Murphy Letter
(also mentioned under "False Intelligence Reports," above)

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT

REPORTS RECEIVED BY THE STATE DEPT. ON MARCH 24, 1959

WAS A LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN TEL AVIV

REPORTING THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD DECIDED

TO ABANDON THE POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE

IN THE

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND TO TAKE AN ACTIVE

ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

THE LETTER STATED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

HAD DECIDED TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

India desk

25X1A9a

pages 85-86:487'

Blitz is directed by an Indian national named R. K. Karanjia. In 1947 Karanjia stated that he had once been a CP member but had left the Party. He has since denied ever having been a member. He has consistently used Blitz, however, as a vehicle for pro-Soviet (and pro-Nasser) propaganda. Blitz regarded the local Communist Party and its affairs with a faintly

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jaundiced editorial eye until about mid-1957, when it began to move in the direction of approval of Indian Party actions. It still criticizes the Party from time to time, but was a consistent and violent propagandist on behalf of the Communist government of Kerala. In the summer of 1958, Karanjia made his first step toward official identification with Communist-sponsored organizations as such when he attended the meeting of the World Peace Council in Stockholm and was elected to membership in the Council. On the return journey to India, he stopped in London, Paris and Cairo. Karanjia and his paper still have no official connection with the Indian Communist Party, but the role of both as propagandists for the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc is frank and violent.

During 1959 Blitz surfaced no Bloc propaganda forgeries, and gradually ceased replaying them, although its anti-Western, pro-Bloc propaganda line did not change.

In addition to a small staff of correspondents in various parts of the India, Blitz maintains a permanent correspondent (Paula Wiking) in London. The paper claims a circulation of 80,000.

official's copy
The Delhi Times. Replayed the Berry Letter in June 1958. The newspaper is a weekly, published in New Delhi. It is *has no* not connected with the Indian Communist Party, but is a chronic purveyor of Bloc propaganda, including perennial "plot charges" against the West.

EE - Czech desk

page 63:

25X1A9a

West Germany and Austria. The Ceske Slovo Campaign. Ceske Slovo is a bona fide Czech emigre newspaper, published by Czech emigres in Munich. In June 1958 a forged newspaper purporting to be the July 1958 issue of Ceske Slovo went into circulation. The forged edition carried anti-Western propaganda, including the claim that Ceske Slovo was going out of existence because its editors were disillusioned with the West. It was an accurate duplicate of the format and style of the real Ceske Slovo. The forged issues were mailed "black" from Munich and Vienna to some current and some former subscribers of the real newspaper, through use of two genuine mailing lists. One of these was an out-of-date list obtained several years earlier by means unknown. The other was up-to-date, and had been obtained through a recent burglary of the offices of the real Ceske Slovo. The fact that the burglary and forgery were a Czech intelligence operation has since been confirmed.

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page 83:

3. Czechoslovakian Assets. See paragraph D-3 of Section IV above for the role of Czech intelligence in West Germany and Austria in the Ceske Slovo forgery.

page 92:

Svobodne Ceskoslovensko. Pro-regime Czech-language monthly which has been published in Chicago, Illinois, for about 10 years. Its circulation is approximately 1200 copies. The paper and its publishers are not connected

with the Communist Party but repeated the propaganda line of the Czech Communist regime. In Aug 58, the paper replayed, as authentic, material from the forged issue of Ceske Slovo.

EE

page 64:

4. Hand-to-Hand Distribution

25X1A8a

1957. A Middle Eastern country. In late March 1957 an official East German Trade Delegation representative in a Middle Eastern country met secretly with an unidentified individual or individuals who were connected with the Arab League, and arranged to have the Rockefeller Letter and its sequel, the Dulles Memorandum, translated into Arabic and distributed to the Governments of the Arab League member states.

page 82: (list of Bloc assets used in covert distribution of forgeries)

2. East German Assets

See paragraph D-4 of Section IV above for report on the role of an East German Trade Delegation official in covert replay of the Rockefeller Letter and the Dulles memorandum to the Arab League member governments.

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As noted elsewhere in this study, technical evidence has established the O' Shaughnessy Letter forgery as having been typed on an HVA typewriter.

2. Black propaganda against military targets within West Germany and against NATO is handled in covert operations conducted by an "Independent Department" under the Chief of the Political Administration of the East German Army, or his deputy for ideological activity. CP background and current membership is required of all East German staff members and agents, but forbidden for prospective West German agents. The SED (CP) Party Secretary is consulted "in the event of particularly important questions"

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** Is this unit what we are looking for? Does this name tell us anything?*

not necessary

This unit turns out various kinds of psychological warfare literature for covert distribution in West Germany. This literature presumably includes propaganda forgeries, but since none of the internationally-distributed forgeries discussed in this paper have been traced to it details of

its operation are outside the scope of this discussion.

EE

25X1A8a

p. 12:

Single- Forgery Campaigns

Of the seven forgeries which were launched singly, one (the O' Shaughnessy Letter) was established by its subject and by certain operational details as part of a known East German IS operation and one as an operation of the Czech IS.

p. 24-25:


Names and addresses needed for operational use.


Still another type of factual data used is, of


course, the names and addresses of target individuals when the forgery is to be surfaced by covert mailing rather than by overt means. Target addresses for use in "black" mailing of psychological warfare material are known to be obtained by the East German IS (and, presumably, by the Soviet IS as well) through overt research facilities--telephone directories, diplomatic lists, names and addresses culled from local newspapers, overt directories of government units, from lists of foreigners visiting Bloc countries, etc. Others are known, in the case of East Germany, to be obtained from East German intelligence agents travelling in the West. In the one known Czech intelligence operation discussed in this paper (the Ceske Slovo Campaign), mailing addresses were obtained by burglarizing the offices of the real Ceske Slovo and making off with its subscription list.

p. 39:

Operational Carelessness--Using Typewriters Which Betray the Forgery

Examples: It has been determined that the machine used in typing the Rockefeller Letter was not of American manufacture, and was probably made before World War II by Rheinmetall V. E. B., which is located at Sommerda bei Erfurt, in Thuringia, East Germany. 

Analysis indicates that the Berry Letter was typed on either an unknown foreign machine or a rebuilt combination of different typewriter machine parts, possibly of American origin. 

In another instance (the O' Shaughnessy Letter) the machine on which a forgery surfaced in West Germany had been typed proved to be the same one used a few months earlier in a known East German intelligence-service (HVA) psychological warfare operation of another type. 

25X1A8a

25X1A6b

EE
page 60:

3. Mailing "black"

25X1A8a

.....
~~page 60~~ 1957: West Germany. The O' Shaughnessy Letter.

On 5 July 1957 a letter was mailed in Munich, addressed to a high French official in West Germany. Having thus been delivered to its single target--the French Government--the letter was never published or replayed in any way.

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The document, mailed so simply, was a forged letter addressed to the State Department in Washington and carrying the typewritten 'signature' of Elin O'Shaughnessy, Chief of the Political Division of the American Embassy in West Germany. It called the attention of "the State Department" to the activity of reactionary ultranationalist groups in West Germany, and advised that the U. S. Government support these groups and use them. In the context of the period in which it was mailed, the forgery was obviously expected to suggest to the French Government that the U. S. Government viewed with favor "West German ultranationalist groups" like the one that was currently receiving extensive publicity in the French press. One of the biggest news stories of the summer of 1957 in France was the terrorist murder of Mme. Tremmeaud, the wife of the Prefet de Police at Strasbourg. Mme. Tremmeaud had been killed, on 17 May 1957, by a bomb mailed to her husband in the guise of a gift package of cigars, and the French press over the following weeks emphasized the growing conviction of the investigating authorities that there was a connection between this covertly-mailed bomb and a flood of particularly vicious hate

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letters mailed at the same time (and in the same Paris post office) to various French officials and private individuals in Paris and in Alsace-Lorraine. The letters carried the 'signature' of a purported West German neo-fascist group calling itself the Kampfverband fuer Ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland and demanding that Alsace-Lorraine be returned to Germany. (Other letters in the series had been sent, at various times, to Americans stationed in Germany--including Elim O'Shaughnessy.) It has since been established that the Kampfverband is a phantom organization, existing only as a signature placed on letters and leaflets which are prepared by the East German foreign intelligence service HVA, and mailed in France and West Germany by couriers sent from East Germany for that purpose (see paragraph C-2 of Section VII below). Bloc cooperation in promotion of psychological warfare campaigns was pointed up in connection with this campaign when, in May 1958, a long Radio Moscow broadcast to France, in French, warned its listeners against the nefarious activities of the "West German" Kampfverband fuer Ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland and strongly implied that this "West German neo-fascist organization" was secretly supported by the West German Government.

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pp. 101-103

C. The East German Centers

1. Political targets in West Germany and France are reached through covert operations run by the East German equivalent of the Soviet KGB. This is HVA (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung), which is the foreign intelligence branch of the Ministry of State Security (MIS) and is also a unit in the structure of the Communist Party of East Germany (SED). The organization works with a Soviet adviser. While HVA conducted psychological warfare operations prior to 1957, it was only in January of that year that psychological warfare was officially announced within HVA as a major operational responsibility of that organization, and HVA began exerting pressure on its personnel to increase the number of such operations and to keep their volume high. One unit within HVA is responsible for control and coordination of psychological warfare operations, and for evaluation and dissemination of overt and covert information and information requirements. The objectives of HVA psychological warfare operations are:

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- (a) to create antagonism among the Western Allies;
- (b) to mislead and frighten the populations of the target areas;
- (c) to channel misinformation into the hands of Western intelligence organizations.

When the defector who gave the above information in 1957 was shown copies of the leaflets signed Kampfverband fuer ein Unabhngiges Deutschland (q.v. in the discussion of the O'Shaughnessy Letter, in paragraph D-3 of Section IV above), he promptly identified them as a product of one of the HVA operations, stating that the name of the "signing" organization was simply placed on the material by HVA in printing the leaflets, in order to give an appearance of authenticity. Another HVA operation mentioned by the same defector was the preparation, in mid-1957, of letters on forged letterheads of the Berlin office of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). The letters indicated that the British Foreign Office had directed BBC in Berlin to support the "Goettingen Declaration" which had recently been issued by eighteen German nuclear physicists. The letters were mailed to the West German Foreign Secretary and other leading West German figures.

Sanitized

25X1A9a

Release

CIA-RDP78-00915R001200060034-5

25X1A9a

19 Jan 60: [redacted] read this, says it is info that doesn't need to be coordinated with desk since by nature it would be overt

Indonesian desk

page 84:

Berita Minggu, weekly newspaper published in Djakarta...

Berita Minggu has no official connection with the CP.

Until 1956 the paper was a spokesman for one of the Indonesian non-Communist political parties. In 1956 it was sold, and under the new management began its policy of following the Bloc propaganda line. Since 1956 also, the paper has been used consistently for publication of unattributable Bloc propaganda of the "Misinformation" variety--printing as news stories false charges of Western plots, aggression plans, and so forth.

Bintang Timur, published in Djakarta, replayed the Frost Letter Campaign on 20 June 1958. The etc.

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(section entitled "Notes on Central Planning and organization of Forgery Campaigns")
pp. 94-99:

B. The Soviet Center

1. RIS defector reports based upon experience in various Soviet intelligence components up to early 1952 have mentioned specific "misinformation" units within the Comintern, GRU, MVD and KI. Defectors whose experience in Soviet intelligence services extended beyond the dissolution of the KI in 1951 and ended in 1954, however, have stated that the RIS as they knew it in 1951-54 did not distinguish organizationally between

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misinformation and other political/psychological warfare operations or between this field of operation and intelligence collecting.

2. A GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence) official who defected during World War II made the following statement in mid-1958 concerning organizational responsibility in the USSR for the conduct of black propaganda and psychological warfare operations outside the Communist bloc. This comment is the defector's own projection of the situation as he knew it into terms of present conditions within the USSR:

"The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) directed and still directs political, black-propaganda and psychological warfare operations through various channels. These channels, depending on time and place, would be

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ambassadors and other top-echelon Soviet diplomats, and the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs);

TASS;
the Soviet press;
the political departments of the Soviet armed forces and KGB;
operational units of GRU and KGB;
individual Soviet writers and propagandists;
the Soviet General Staff.

"It must be assumed that the direction of this activity is well planned and organized by the CPSU

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itself. However, it would be wrong to assume that the Department of Propaganda and Agitation (Agitprop) of the Central Committee of the CPSU is charged with this function. It would be more correct to assume that one of the close lieutenants of the CPSU's boss (Nikita Khrushchev at present, for example) who is at the same time a member of the Presidium (formerly the Politburo) is charged with this function. This individual would then be responsible to Khrushchev (in present-day terms) and direct the whole job. This individual would coordinate the political, black propaganda and psychological warfare operations among the various channels mentioned above." 25X1X6

- 25X1X6 3. An MVD (now known as KGB) officer [redacted] states: "Official Soviet propaganda originates within the Central Committee, probably in the Foreign Directorate, and is distributed abroad through VOKS, the Soviet Information Bureau and TASS." (The word used by the defector is "Directorate"--Upravleniye--and not "Section"--Otdel. He distinguished between the Foreign Directorate and the Foreign Section, which is responsible for work with foreign parties.) The defector further explained that "Special or unusual propaganda and psychological warfare assignments which cannot be handled through the above channels are sometimes given to the MVD. In all cases the Central Committee is the originator and/or the final arbiter of propaganda and psychological warfare material... The Soviet intelligence services often support or subsidize
- Comment*
State Security
now KGB

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anti-American publications. Assignment of such tasks as support of anti-American publications comes to the Soviet intelligence service from within the Central Committee, CPSU." As a specific example the defector mentioned a case of 1947-49 which had been described to him by an MVD code clerk in 1953. The code clerk stated that, in the course of his work in handling cable traffic from the Balkans and Near East residences of MVD, he had followed an incident involving an MVD agent who was a high official on a newspaper in either Turkey or Iran. The paper itself was not known to be either Communist or fellow-travelling. "Moscow had the habit of transmitting the content of forthcoming editorials of common interest to the country in question and the USSR. The editorials always appeared one to three days before the same topic appeared in Pravda and, of course, were in complete agreement with Pravda. On one occasion a slip-up occurred. Moscow had transmitted the substance of a forthcoming editorial to the country concerned and the material was put into the local language and set up in type. At the last moment, Moscow transmitted instructions cancelling the editorial. It was too late, and the thing was printed. Moscow, according to the code clerk, was very angry with the MVD Center over the incident."

4. The theme of KGB operations in the field of political intelligence, political action and psychological warfare--including one of the specific forgeries discussed in this study--

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25X1X6

appeared again when the Soviet who defected 1959 (discussed in paragraph B-3, above) was debriefed. While the defector was in Moscow in late 1957, before his departure for Burma, he was co-opted for covert, part-time duty with an organization which he knew only as "political intelligence" but which, as stated above, was actually the KGB. The source had travelled as interpreter with a Burmese delegation which was visiting the USSR in the fall of 1957, on an assignment made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another of the Soviet officials accompanying the delegation was Vladimir Us, who had formerly served as First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon. After the group returned to Moscow, the source was approached by Vladimir Us and Boris Anatolievich Galashin of the Soviet Embassy, Rangoon. The two men invited the source to lunch, and in the course of the lunch identified themselves as representatives of "political intelligence". They stated that they wanted the source to serve with the section maintained by this organization within the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon. He was told that his connection with the section must be kept secret from everyone in the Embassy, including the Ambassador. The source agreed, and signed a security agreement which, as nearly as he can now remember, read:

"I, _____ (true name) _____, promise to render my utmost help to fulfill the tasks and obligations given to me. If I should reveal or betray any

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secrets that were given to me, I am ready to meet any punishment including death. I take the name (pseudonym)."

The wording of the oath used by the Soviet intelligence services varies slightly in wording since it is usually dictated to the agent verbally by the officer who has recruited him. The wording as this source remembers it is, however, representative of the type of oath used by the intelligence services.

The source was also given a recognition signal ("Greetings from _____") which would be used by his contact in Rangoon. When the source arrived in Rangoon the individual who thus identified himself was Ivan Mikhailovich Vozniy, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, who eventually appeared to be the civilian intelligence chief in Rangoon. Throughout his stay in Rangoon the source worked on the Foreign Service job to which he had originally been assigned and, over and above his Embassy working hours, functioned covertly as translator, spotter (for later recruiting) and political reporter for Vozniy. In the course of this work he handled the texts (unattributable) of anti-American and anti-Western newspaper articles which were forwarded from Moscow for insertion in local newspapers subsidized by the Vozniy section for this purpose. One of the articles on which he worked was the Russian original of the propaganda forgery known as the Frost Letter, which was surfaced in the

Rangoon newspaper the Mirror.

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Soviet Embassy, Rangoon, Burma. KGB

Residentura. See Section VII, paragraph B-4 below, for details of the recruitment of a Foreign Service employee at the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon by ~~Vladimir Orlov~~ and ~~Boris Anatolievich Galashin~~ of KGB, for part-time service in the political intelligence offices of the KGB residentura in Rangoon. The source has identified several past and current Soviet officials in Rangoon as members of the group he knew as the "political intelligence section", i. e. as working under the direction of Ivan Mikhailovich Vozniy on collection of political intelligence and on covert political action and psychological warfare operations. The full list is outside the scope of this paper, but the following partial list gives an idea of the range of cover designations used by KGB political intelligence officers.

Ivan Mikhailovich Vozniy. Overt title: First Secretary, Soviet Embassy. Source's information indicates that he is probably chief of the Burmese residentura of KGB.

Boris Anatolievich Galashin. Overt title: Attaché, Soviet Embassy.

Ivan Nikolayevich Rogachev. Overt title: Member of the Soviet Commercial representation as representative of Sovk-sportfilm, Soviet Embassy.

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Igor Roestislavovich Trushkovsky. Overt title: Second Secretary in charge of cultural affairs (i. e. VOKS representative). Actually, according to the defector, Trushkovsky was Voznyi's second in command in the "political intelligence" section or, more accurately, in the KGB residentura.

The psychological warfare operations of the residentura included subsidies to several Burmese newspapers for publication of unattributable anti-American and anti-Western propaganda, which the newspaper concerned usually identified as "From Our Correspondent in _____" another country (Japan, Indonesia, etc.). The source states that the residentura had "direct control" of the People's Journal, "lesser though close control" of The Mirror and Botataung, and, "in addition, often used Pyidaungsu, the New Light of Burma and The Burman." (All of these newspapers were closed by the Burmese Government during the spring of 1959.) The anti-American articles were written in Moscow and sent as photocopies, in Russian, to the residentura in Rangoon. When the source was shown the issue of The Mirror, dated 8 June 1958, he at once identified the article in which the Frost Letter (q. v. in Attachment 6) was surfaced as one he had first seen as a photocopy, in Russian. It had been handed to him as a part

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pages 79 and 80:

1844-3

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of his work for the residentura, for comparison of the Burmese text in The Mirror with the Russian wording of the original. The source did not know any of the details of the operation through which the original Russian text had been translated for The Mirror and transmitted to the newspaper. He stated, however, that other Moscow articles which he had handled had been translated from Russian into English within the residentura and then "fed to the local newspapers, principally The Mirror and Botataung. Often the articles appeared in these two papers translated word for word from the English into Burmese, and sometimes with a few minor changes." The Residentura then compared the articles in Burmese with the original Russian versions to check on accuracy, made notes on any variations, and sent reports on the results back to Moscow.